SETTLING CLAIMS FOR REPARATIONS
Daniel Butt*
The scale and character of past injustice can seem
overwhelming. Grievous wrongdoing characterizes so much of human
history, both within and between different political communities. This
raises a familiar question of reparative justice: what is owed in the
present as a result of the unjust actions of the past? This article asks
what should be done in situations where contemporary debts stemming
from past injustice are massive in scale, and seemingly call for nonideal resolution or settlement. Drawing on recent work by Sara
Amighetti and Alasia Nuti on deliberative reparative processes, the
article differentiates between two different approaches to settling
claims for reparation. The first pursues settlement in a legal or quasilegal sense, seeking to close a matter through discussion, compromise,
and bargaining in such a way as to maximize one’s interest while
drawing a line under the events in question. The second is grounded
not in one’s own interest but in an acknowledgement of the inevitable
inadequacy of one’s reparative response. Such an approach to
settlement centres the agency of the individuals and groups harmed by
past wrongdoing. The article examines the reparations issue with
reference to a range of recent cases of alleged settlement, including
claims for reparation for torture by the British army in Kenya in the
1950s, for sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army in East Asia
in the Second World War, and for genocide by German colonial forces
between 1904 and 1908.
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I. THE EXTENT OF CONTEMPORARY REPARATIVE OBLIGATIONS
Whether and to what extent any present-day persons or groups
owe rectificatory obligations to others as a result of historic injustice
is a much-disputed question. While some writers put forward a range
of different mechanisms for linking present-day parties to past
wrongdoing, others deny that the actions of previous generations can
have implications for those who were not responsible for the
commission of the acts in question. This article begins where many
others conclude: it accepts the force of at least some arguments that
ground contemporary reparative duties in the relation between past and
present. In other work, I have described three ways in which present
day persons can be connected in historic injustice in a morally relevant
manner, as follows:
Benefit: when present day parties are advantaged, and others
disadvantaged, by the automatic effects of historic injustice.
Entitlement: when present day parties are in possession of
property (however conceived) to which others have inherited
entitlements.
Responsibility: when present day parties are members of
historically continuous communities which bear ongoing
responsibility for failing to fulfil rectificatory duties to others.1
A wide range of authors have put forward accounts that can be
categorised into these brackets, in addition to other theories, such as
Farid Abel-Nour’s discussion of active association with the actions of
one’s ancestors,2 or Janna Thompson’s account of transgenerational
contracts.3 Of course, all are controversial, and arguments in favour of
contemporary reparative obligations will have to contend with
skeptical arguments that claim the passage of time lessens or
eliminates the need to rectify past wrongdoing. It is striking that much
existing work in favour of reparations has sought to pick a single form
of morally relevant connection, such as claims grounded in (1) the
Beneficiary Pays Principle (or BPP) or (2) focusing on the inheritance
of property. Call this the Reductionist Strategy.

1

DANIEL BUTT, RECTIFYING INTERNATIONAL INJUSTICE: PRINCIPLES OF COMPENSATION AND
RESTITUTION BETWEEN NATIONS (Oxford University Press 2009).
2
Farid Abdel-Nour, National Responsibility, 31 POL. THEORY 693 (2003).
3
JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PAST: REPARATIONS AND HISTORICAL
INJUSTICE (Polity 2002).
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This takes two forms. The first starts from the morally relevant
form of connection between past and present itself. It asks whether it
rests on convincing normative foundations. Is it true that the
connection in question gives rise to a reparative duty? So, for example,
is it right to think that the involuntary receipt of a benefit stemming
from an injustice can give rise to a duty to compensate those harmed
by the injustice in question? Then, it asks what the practical
implications of implementing the principle would be – who has in fact
benefited and been harmed in the right kind of way, and what should
be done about it? The second starts not with the principle but with the
proposed course of action – typically either a broad programme of
reparations in general (such as reparations for slavery or colonialism),
or a more specific reparative policy in a more limited domain, such as
migration or the allocation of the costs of climate change. It then asks
what specific principle is best suited to ground the policy in question.
There are various reasons why one might seek to base a given
reparative claim on a specific, discrete principle. Some are perhaps to
do with the nature of academic publishing, whereby one first dismisses
other theories, before providing one’s own favoured account. But the
literature also contains more deliberate methodological manoeuvres,
whereby authors argue that specific ways of thinking about past
wrongdoing avoid particular types of objections. If one has a given
policy goal in mind, then such a strategy has obvious appeal – there is
a good case for being parsimonious, and only taking on the amount of
argumentative baggage that is necessary to establish one’s argument,
or (insofar as this is different) to persuade or motivate one’s audience.
The Reductionist Strategy, then, has its uses. But it also has the effect
of minimising the overall extent of the reparative debt, which is
possessed by contemporary agents, particularly states, which are
characterised by some kind of ongoing, albeit messy and perhaps
interrupted, existence through time. It means that the opponents of
contemporary reparative obligations are able to focus on the particular
weaknesses of specific accounts: pointing to periods of time, for
example, where the given principle does not seem to be in play (if there
are gaps in the continuous institutional identity of states, for example,
or if chains of inheritance are broken); or maintaining that particular
models of reparative obligations are unable to extend to all areas of
contemporary reparative politics (can, for example, the inheritance
model do anything about the non-material dimensions of historic
injustice? Can the BPP, which rests on the involuntary, and so non-
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blameworthy, receipt of benefits say anything useful about political
apologies for past wrongdoing?)
What if, instead of seeing such principles as in competition
with one another, we see them as largely complementary, and as
potentially having force in different circumstances, sometimes
collectively, and sometimes in concert with others? This would mean
that a full account of what is owed would have to include all morally
relevant linkages between past and present in play. It would need to
take account of the way that reparative duties of benefit and
entitlement, which can be acquired, in the first instance, quite
innocently, can give rise to further duties of reparation when they go
unfulfilled, meaning that the agents in question are now themselves
wrongdoers.
Failing to fulfil a rectificatory obligation is not a one-off action,
but an ongoing process: each day that the obligation is not fulfilled is
a day when something that should have been done is not done. Thus,
an acceptance of the existence of present-day state-level rectificatory
obligations typically commits one to a particular view of the modernday states which possess the obligations in question as repeat
offenders: wrongdoers whose unjust actions stretch back in time, often
to the commission of the original act of injustice itself.
In many cases, the narrative told will be a relatively
uncomplicated one of continuous malfeasance, which originates in
historic wrongdoing that straightforwardly was not rectified at the
time. If we look at history during and since the colonial period, the
story is one of sustained and repeated wrongdoing. Multiple grave
wrongs were perpetrated, often over prolonged periods of time with no
subsequent attempt to apologise or to compensate the victim. For
example, Britain’s initial involvement in the slave trade, which came
to a formal end not with the payment of compensation to those
enslaved and their families and communities, but to the slave-owners
who lost out financially as a result of the emancipation of their
“property”.4 Moreover, the British experience of decolonisation,
whereby independence for territories such as Kenya was only granted
on the condition of agreement that liability for the wrongs of the
colonial period were the responsibility of the new successor

4
NICHOLAS DRAPER, THE PRICE OF EMANCIPATION: SLAVE-OWNERSHIP, COMPENSATION
AND BRITISH SOCIETY AT THE END OF SLAVERY (Cambridge University Press 2009).

64

JOURNAL OF RACE, GENDER, AND ETHNICITY Vol. 11

governments, rather than the British state.5 Consider the postindependence relationship of Haiti and France, whereby Haiti was
compelled to pay devastating levels of compensation to France
between 1825 and 1947 to compensate France for its losses following
Haiti’s successful slave revolt.6 The list goes on and on.
It is helpful at this point to consider two examples of modernday reparative claims to appreciate the potential scale of contemporary
reparative liabilities. First, claims for reparation for slavery in the
USA. There are various ways to quantify what would be owed if the
U.S. Government were to seek to pay reparations in the present day.
Some attempts take a minimalist approach, focusing just on a sub-set
of claims which, one might think, could be articulated without the need
for contentious counterfactual reasoning, by maintaining that specific
property entitlements emanating from slavery could have been
inherited by the descendants of slaves.
For example, one recent study by Thomas Craemer estimates
the present value of U.S. slave labour for the 89 years from the
country’s founding until the end of the Civil War. Based on wages paid
to labourers in the period before the Civil War, and assuming an
average of 12 hours of work a day, seven days a week, he gives an
estimate in 2009 dollars ranging from $5.9 to $14.2 trillion.7 This is a
lot of money. It is not clear that it is an impossible sum for the U.S.
Government to pay, especially if structured over multiple years, and
given that it might be seen as a form of internal investment (for
comparison, Joe Biden’s recently proposed budget involves initial
annual spending of $6 trillion, rising to $8.2 trillion by 2031).8 But it
must be stressed that this sum relates only to 89 years of wages. There
is nothing in such a figure relating to compensation for enslavement,
for physical and mental abuse, for all the myriad wrongs that
accompanied slavery. Nor is there consideration of the wrong of not
5
MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (Oxford University Press 2009).
6
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The payment of the compensation could only be funded by borrowing further money from
French banks at extortionate rates. As Peter Hallward argues, “Haitians have… had to pay
their original oppressors three times over – through the slaves’ initial labour, through
compensation for the French loss of this labour, and then in interest on the payment of this
compensation.” Peter Hallward, Option Zero in Haiti, 27 NEW LEFT REVIEW 23, 26 (2004).
7
Thomas Craemer, Estimating Slavery Reparations: Present Value Comparisons of
Historical Multigenerational Reparations Policies, 96 SOC. SCI. Q. 639 (2015).
8
Jim Tankersley, Biden to Propose $6 Trillion Budget to Make U.S. More Competitive,
N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/27/business/economy/bidenplan.html.
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paying reparations up to now (as distinct from the accumulation of
interest in the money that has not been paid). If we tweak the formula
for calculating the contemporary debt that is owed, we quickly arrive
at eye-watering sums. In his 1973 book The Case for Black
Reparations, Boris Bittker considered how one might go about
constructing a more complete bill to take account of other forms of
historic racial injustice. He writes:
For want of a better measure of these imponderables, we might
speculate about the outcome of a lawsuit for damages brought by a
white pupil who was erroneously assigned to a Jim Crow school for a
school year before Brown v. Board of Education was decided. I venture
the guess that a Southern jury would be more likely to award damages
of $25,000 rather than $1,000. (Without wishing to overemphasize it,
I offer as a bit of relevant evidence an $875 jury award in 1913 for a
white railroad passenger for being compelled to ride for three miles in
a Jim Crow car.9)
If we calculate the reparative debt by plugging in these kinds
of figures and holding that equivalent sums, over the lifetimes of those
wronged, should be paid to descendants, with interest, we would
plausibly be looking at a reparative bill of a quite extraordinary size.
Our second case concerns Greece and Germany. At the peak of
the Greek debt crisis in 2015, much play was made of the claim that
there was something odd about thinking that Greece was in historical
debt to Germany, given the nature of their relations during the Second
World War. The Tsipras government spoke explicitly of bringing
reparations into the reckoning of the terms for the Greek financial
bailout, and the following specific claims, along with others, were
invoked:
Tens, possibly hundreds, of billions of euros (dollars) in
present-day money as compensation for destroyed infrastructure and
goods, including archaeological treasures, looted by the Nazis from
1941 to 1944. Compensation for the estimated 300,000 people who
died from famine during the winter of 1941-1942. Compensation for
the slaughter of civilians as reprisals for partisan attacks. One of the
most infamous massacres took place in the Greek village of Distomo
on June 10, 1944, when Waffen-SS soldiers killed more than 200
women, children and elderly residents. Another in Kalavryta in

9
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December 1943 involved German troops killing more than 500
civilians, including virtually all of the town’s males aged 14 or over.
Repayment of some 1.9 billion drachmas, around 50 million
euros ($55 million dollars) today, that the Jewish community paid as
ransom to occupying authorities in 1942 in return for 10,000 Jewish
men being held as slave laborers. The men were released only to be
sent to concentration camps the following year. Repayment of an
interest-free loan of 568 million Reichsmark (7.1 billion euros or $7.7
billion dollars) that the Nazis forced Greece to make to Germany in
1942. Returning the train fares that the Reichsbahn received for
transporting Jews to their deaths.10
The range of different claims here is striking. Some refer to
terrible wrongs: death from famine, the slaughter of civilians, for
which there can evidently be no adequate compensatory response.
Others are tangible, specific, even tragically mundane: claims relating
to specific sums of money misappropriated in very particular
circumstances, such as train fares forcibly levied to take Jews to their
deaths. The point is how very quickly the bill adds up when we are
only talking about the material aspects of historic wrongdoing. Even if
this was the only basis for present day reparative obligations, the
liability for colonial powers such as the UK would be massive.
The scale of British colonialism was breath taking, in Africa,
Asia, and beyond – the sun never set, after all, on the British Empire.
But of course, one can say much more. To characterize the injustice of
colonialism in material terms is to miss the point of the particular kind
of grievous wrongdoing which it entailed.11 If one expands the scope
of rectificatory justice to maintain that claims to compensation can be
inherited by victims, the liability of present-day states such as the UK
looks to be gigantic.12 It is commonly supposed that accounts of
international distributive justice can be categorised into more or less
demanding camps. In the former category are the forward-looking
redistributive cosmopolitans, in the latter, those who advocate
backward looking principles stressing national responsibility and selfdetermination. The implication of this article is that it might not
10

Frank Jordans, Greece Fights German Bailout Demands with Nazi-Era Claims, THE
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actually be right to think that some variant of cosmopolitan
egalitarianism is the account of international distributive justice which
places the most demands on currently advantaged states. A thoroughgoing backward-looking account which took seriously the ongoing
wrongful agency of western powers could conclude that their
rectificatory obligations require more in reparative transfers and
structural reform than would be needed were one seeking to pursue a
patterned distribution such as global equality of opportunity. The
ongoing malfeasance of contemporary states may mean that their
reparative duties are more demanding under a scheme of corrective
justice than their duties of redistribution would be even under a highly
redistributive scheme of distributive justice. The question then arises
as to how reparative obligations on such a scale could possibly be met.
II. THE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM
Suppose we accept that there is a compelling case in justice for
the payment of substantial reparations in the present day. What should
happen next? How should this claim about what justice requires feed
into real world public policy debates? This raises several questions on
the relation between theory and practice. These questions are primarily
philosophical within the nature of reparative justice itself. For
example, to what extent should accounts of reparative justice seek to
give all-things-considered answers to questions of what should be
done, as opposed to articulating principles of justice that can be
plugged into more general accounts of, for example, transitional justice
and/or reconciliation?
Some are primarily practical, about how we translate
arguments made in theoretical contexts into practice: how should
theorists argue if they want to motivate their audience to act, or
maximise their impact on the formulation of public policy? To what
extent should accounts of reparative justice be grounded in
controversial moral principles, such as distributive egalitarianism?
There are also important questions about the extent to which historic
injustice has implications for other policy areas in the present day, such
as immigration policy, the allocation costs of climate change,
obligations of humanitarian intervention, and so forth. But there is a
further question, which political theorists often neglect, or assume an
answer to: to what extent should accounts of reparative justice seek to
make policy prescriptions which are intended to be followed by
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political actors, as opposed to feeding into wider deliberative
processes?13
In a recent article, “Towards a Shared Redress: Achieving
Historical Justice Through Democratic Deliberation”, Sara Amighetti
and Alasia Nuti argue against what they call the “unilateral” approach
to reparative justice, which seeks to give a determinate answer to the
question of what is owed as a matter of reparative justice by focusing
on the duties of wrongdoers, or others with reparative obligations.
Drawing on the example of claims for reparations made by the
Caricom Reparations Commission, set up by Caribbean states in 2013,
they write:
The example of CARICOM’s fight suggests that it is those who
have been wronged that usually advance claims of rectification.
Looking at the practice can illuminate how those who suffered from
historical injustice become actors in claiming redress. However, this
significantly contrasts with the starting point of a great number of
mainstream normative accounts that deal with the rectification of
slavery and colonialism. Such accounts have a tendency to explicitly
focus on the obligations that those who committed the injustice should
fulfil, thus neglecting the possible claims of the victims. While this is
usually done to argue that wrongdoers have responsibilities even when
the victims do not put forward rectification claims, it has the effect of
altogether overlooking the importance of an active engagement with
the wronged in determining the form of redress.14
Amighetti and Nuti’s approach focuses on the process of
shared deliberation towards the redress of historic injustice. They
highlight two problems with neglecting the active contribution that
victims can make to redress: 1) The epistemic problem: insofar as the
question of how to redress slavery and colonialism addresses an
injustice, it requires an understanding of that injustice;15 2) The agency
problem: a conception of redress that treats the former enslaved and
colonized as passive recipients is likely to reinforce a discursive frame
that re-activates the same social categories used to justify these
injustices.16
13
Jeremy Waldron, What Plato Would Allow, in THEORY AND PRACTICE: NOMOS XXXVII
138 (Ian Shapiro & Judith Wagner DeCew, eds., 1995).
14
Sara Amighetti & Alasia Nuti, Towards a Shared Redress: Achieving Historical Justice
Through Democratic Deliberation, 23 J. OF POL. PHIL. 385, 387 (2015).
15
Id. at 387.
16
Id. at 388.
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These are powerful critiques, and it is important that those
working on the political theory of reparations acknowledge their force.
It is indeed undesirable if arguments for reparations stipulate what
should be done to bring about reparative justice in a way that neither
draws upon the knowledge nor involves the active participation of
victims of wrongdoing.17 My aim in this section is to add a third
problem to this account, which does not so much argue for process
rather than outcomes, as argue that a focus on outcomes leads us
inevitably to thinking about processes. This third problem is what I call
the settlement problem. Redressing serious wrongdoing typically
involves an inadequate compensatory response, which necessitates the
involvement of the wronged.
I have argued that historic colonial wrongdoing, and
subsequent failures to effect redress, have given rise to gigantic
contemporary reparative obligations. How should those possessing
such obligations respond to a bill of such a scale? There seem to be
three options. First, one might do nothing, and use the scale of the debt
as a pretext for avoiding any kind of reparative obligation whatsoever.
This seems straightforwardly unacceptable from a moral point of view
– an inability to pay a debt does not mean that debt disappears, it just
means that it cannot be paid in full. At the very least, one ought to pay
as much as one can. It is important here to distinguish the claim that
some kinds of harm are non-compensable in the sense that paying any
kind of compensation is inappropriate, from the claim that some kinds
of harm are non-compensable in the sense that it is not possible fully
to compensate a victim, either by providing substitute means to enable
them to pursue their original ends, or by providing them with the means
to pursue other, equally desirable ends.18
Non-compensability in the second sense does not mean that
compensation should not be paid, it just means that it must be accepted
that compensation will be inadequate to make up for the loss in
question. The question of just what is owed in this kind of case is
complicated and answered differently in different legal jurisdictions.19
When confronted with very serious harms, such as the death of a
spouse or a child, many jurisdictions opt for a relatively narrow form
17

CHARLES MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS / WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL LIBERALISM
181-200 (Oxford University Press 2017).
18
Robert E. Goodin, Theories of Compensation, 9 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 56 (1989).
19
Robert Cooter & David DePianto, Damages for Incompensable Harms, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 439 (Jennifer H. Arlen, ed. 2013).
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of compensation that primarily refers to the tangible financial loss
caused by the death, sometimes alongside a token payment for mental
distress, and sometimes without even this.
Other legal understandings of the nature of compensation in
tort law are much more expansive, even if they do seek to place some
limits on what a wrongdoer can owe a victim.20 But even incorporating
conservative estimates of what should be paid in such cases into an
account which allowed such payments to be inherited by descendants
would predictably lead to massive contemporary reparative obligations
in relation to colonialism.
Second, one might attempt to pay in full. There are both hard
and soft limits to such a strategy. In some cases, the amount that is
owed may straightforwardly be greater than the sum of resources at the
disposal of the agent with the reparative duty, and indeed may be
greater than they can expect to be able to access in the foreseeable
future. Even if we are not dealing with sums of quite this scale, there
will likely be extreme reluctance to pay gigantic amounts, given the
predictable impact that doing so will have on the flourishing and life
projects of those who must pay.
The third alternative is to look to make some kind of settlement.
This is perhaps the solution many people are naturally inclined to
support, but it is fraught with moral danger. Settlements for serious
injustice will typically mean victims getting less than they should
under a fully just compensation scheme. This means that unilateral
redress is therefore generally not possible. If a settlement is to
constitute a morally acceptable response to the demands of corrective
justice, the party who is to get less than they should, will need
voluntarily to agree to the terms of the settlement in question. What is
needed – and the irony of this is extraordinary, given how the history
of colonialism has in fact unfolded – is a form of debt forgiveness, not
of but by formerly colonised peoples.
It is helpful here to a do a little more to unpack the idea of
settlement. In his study of the concept, On Settling, Robert Goodin
identifies a range of different usages of the term which he labels
“modes of settling”: specifically, “settling down” in a situation or
place; “settling in”, as in accommodating ourselves to our
circumstances and our place; “settling up” with people we have

20
Robert Cooter, Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1097 (2003).
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displaced, unsettled, or otherwise wronged in the process; “settling
for”, learning to make do in our newly settled circumstances; and
“settling on’ a belief or value, project or commitment, way of being or
way of living.21 He suggests that these different conceptions all share
something in common: specifically, that in settling we look for some
kind of fixity. The search for fixity has certainly been a feature of
various forms of past wrongdoing, and forms of colonial settlement,
corresponding to ‘settling down” and “settling in” on Goodin’s
schema, are good examples of forms of historic injustice that call out
for contemporary redress. Most relevant to our current purposes,
however, are the ideas of “settling up” and “settling for”. The first
relates to the ideal of reparative justice, whereby the moral balance
between perpetrator and victim is restored, with the former doing
whatever is necessary to repair the moral breach. The latter, however,
relates to a non-ideal outcome – where the victim cannot get their due,
but must settle for something less instead, to achieve the kind of fixity
that Goodin describes. The moral danger in settlement lies in the
further injustice suffered by victims in this second scenario.
I have argued that there are good reasons to believe that the
legacy of colonialism gives rise to gigantic contemporary reparative
obligations. Suppose that citizens of Western states such as the UK
accept this belief that they must try their best to settle this debt but
argue that that they will not be able to meet their obligations in full.
The desire on the part of perpetrators to come to a form of settlement
in such cases is not necessarily wrong. One may believe, in good faith,
that the moral value of paying the full price (or of paying as much of
the full price as is literally possible) is trumped by forward-looking
considerations and may understand a settlement in such a case in terms
of balancing forward-looking and backward-looking interests and
obligations in the name of fairness.22
It should be noted that this could still be potentially demanding
depending on one’s account of how to balance backward and forwardlooking considerations. For example, if one were to argue that citizens
of such states should settle at the level where any further payment
would reduce themselves below a level of sufficient welfare. However,
this is not the more familiar understanding of settlement, especially in
legal contexts. In cases of what I term “bad faith settlement”, the
21
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perpetrator is simply unwilling to pay out on the scale in question, and
cannot be made to do so, but is prepared to settle for a smaller sum to
close the issue. Such settlement is grounded not in morality but in selfinterest. It is in the offender’s interest to be able to draw a line under
the events in question, and so they bargain and compromise to pay as
little as possible while achieving their goal of a resolution to given
dispute.
This kind of approach seems clearly unacceptable in relation to
the reparation of historic injustice, though, as will be seen, it is
commonly found in real world cases. Importantly, it is clear that if
settlement has this form, the unilateral approach is manifestly
inappropriate. Bad faith settlement entails perpetrators being let off the
hook. It is not up to the perpetrators themselves to do this. Furthermore,
even if the bad faith settlement is the result of some kind of agreement
with the wronged group (and leaving aside questions of what kind of
level of agreement there needs to be within the group for this to be the
case), the mere fact of agreement does not in any sense mean that
reparative justice has been satisfied if the wronged group in question
have only agreed to the settlement because the offending group is
unwilling to pay any more. A settlement of this form is not only an
inadequate response to injustice – it is a fresh act of injustice against
the victims in itself.
If this is bad faith settlement, what is good faith settlement?
This is a question that can only be answered in outline outside of the
settlement process itself. Good faith settlement accepts the inadequacy
of the compensatory response. It does not claim to make up for that
which cannot be repaired, but acknowledges that it is partial,
incomplete, and in many ways unsatisfactory. It may include, but is
not limited to, material compensation or restitution, and will typically
also include elements of apology, commemoration, and education –
but it does not use commitments in these fields to evade more costly
commitments elsewhere. It ties backward-looking accounts of
reparation to forward-looking concerns of reconciliation and,
potentially, the pursuit of social equality. Good faith settlement can
and should be linked to questions of structural change and institutional
reform. It can and should be linked to deliberative processes and truth
and reconciliation movements.
Good faith settlement engages in open-ended fashion, without
precommitments or limitations. It is emphatically not a negotiation. It
seeks to involve all relevant agents and keeps the question of who has
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standing in deliberation open, paying particular concern to persons
within groups who have historically been oppressed and
disadvantaged. It acknowledges the need to equalise power relations
and develop new forms of relationships. Rather than drawing a line
and forgetting about the past, it acknowledges the significance of
history by committing to a new kind of relationship. In international
terms, we might envisage that good faith settlement might involve the
reform of international and regional governance structures, a
reworking of the Security Council of UN, debt repudiation, and very
substantial commitments to development, regeneration, and climate
justice.23 Its particular terms would, of course, be determined by its
participants.
Bad faith settlement, by contrast, generally doesn’t do any of
this. Yet this is the dominant form in many real-world cases of
purported reparation. Consider three recent such cases. The first relates
to the British government’s decision in 2013 to pay £19.9m in costs
and compensation to more than 5,000 elderly Kenyans who suffered
torture and abuse during the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s.24 Foreign
Secretary William Hague told the House of Commons that the payment
was being made in “full and final settlement” of a High Court action
brought by five victims who suffered under the British colonial
administration. Hague said:
The British government recognises that Kenyans were
subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the hands of the
colonial administration… The British government sincerely regrets
that these abuses took place and that they marred Kenya’s progress to
independence. Torture and ill- treatment are abhorrent violations of
human dignity which we unreservedly condemn.
Britain also agreed to support the construction of a memorial
to the victims of colonial torture and abuse in Nairobi, but “stressed
that the government continued to deny liability for the actions of the
colonial administration and indicated it would defend claims brought
from other former British colonies. “We do not believe that this
settlement establishes a precedent in relation to any other former
British colonial administration.”25
23
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The UK initially opposed this action, accepting that the
claimants were indeed subject to torture by the British colonial
administration, but maintaining that there was no persisting liability
owing to, first, an argument relating to the expiration of a statute of
limitations, and second, the claim that responsibility for British
colonial atrocities had passed to the Kenyan government at the point
of decolonization. The settlement came only when it became clear that
the Government might lose the case. Following the decision, Kenyan
groups announced plans for further legal cases for compensation for a
further 40,000 Kenyans, a move opposed by the UK Government. The
first test case in this litigation was dismissed in 2018, with the judge
ruling that the passage of some fifty years had compromised the
defendant’s ability to defend the claim. The judgment emphasized that
the litigation was a court process in a civil claim, and not a public
inquiry, meaning that despite the factual admissions and settlement
which preceded it, “the claims must stand or fall on established
principles of civil litigation.” 26
The second case concerns women forced into sexual
enslavement during the Second World War by the Japanese Imperial
Army. A deal was reached between Japan and South Korea in 2015
whereby Japan agreed to apologise, accept responsibility, and pay 1bn
yen ($8.3m) to fund victims. South Korea agreed to consider the
matter resolved “finally and irreversibly” if Japan fulfilled its
promises, and to investigate removing a statue symbolising victims,
which activists erected outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul in 2011.
Both sides “agreed to refrain from criticising each other on this issue
in the international community.”27 The agreement came after many
years of inaction, obfuscation, and denial by the Japanese Government
(and similar inaction, during some periods, by the South Korean
government). A number of surviving victims (only 46, by 2015, had
survived and identified themselves) objected to the terms of the deal,
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claiming that they had no role in the agreement.28 South Korean Vice
Foreign Minister Lim Sung-nam was confronted by one such survivor,
88-year-old Lee Yong-su, at a meeting in Seoul. “Which country do
you belong to?”, she shouted at him. “You could at least have let us
know what kind of deal you were striking with Japan. Why are you
trying to kill us twice?”29
The South Korean government announced that it had cancelled
the agreement in 2018 and has since tried to reopen the issue with
Japan. Twelve women filed suit against the South Korean government
in 2016, claiming “that the government had nullified the victims’
individual rights to claim damages from Japan by signing an agreement
not to demand further legal responsibility without consulting with the
victims themselves.” The claim was unsuccessful, with the court ruling
in 2018 that while the agreement “certainly lacked transparency,” the
government had not acted illegally.30 However, a claim against the
Japanese government was upheld by the Seoul District Court in 2021,
which ordered Japan’s government to pay reparations of 100 million
won ($91,300) each to the families of the twelve women.31 Japan has
refused to accept the legitimacy of the ruling, with Prime Minster
Yoshihide Suga claiming that, “[T]he issue of comfort women between
Japan and the Republic of Korea is already settled completely and
finally.”32
It should be clear just how far these cases fall short of the ideal
of good faith settlement. Self-interested settlement under duress, in the
face of the threat of legal action or other forms of external pressure,
which seeks to keep payments to a minimum while foreclosing the
possibility of further actions by others is straightforwardly an
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inadequate response to past wrongdoing. The sums involved seem
obviously inadequate from the perspective of compensatory justice.
Key groups of victims have critically rejected the purported finality of
the processes in question. Arguably a more interesting example is
provided by the recent announcement by the German government that,
following six years of negotiations, it has agreed to pay €1.1bn (via aid
payments over the next 30 years) to Namibia as a response to colonial
atrocities by the German army in the early twentieth century, when
“[t]ens of thousands of men, women and children were shot, tortured
or driven into the Kalahari desert to starve by German troops between
1904 and 1908 after the Herero and Nama tribes rebelled against
colonial rule in what was then named German South West Africa and
is now Namibia.”33
One can certainly point to features of the agreement that seem
to reflect features of “good faith settlement.” In accepting that the
events in question should be labelled as “genocide,” German foreign
minister Heiko Maas stated that “Our aim was and is to find a joint
path to genuine reconciliation in remembrance of the victims. That
includes our naming the events of the German colonial era in today’s
Namibia, and particularly the atrocities between 1904 and 1908,
unsparingly and without euphemisms.” However, strikingly, this
linguistic accommodation does not extend to the language of
“reparations” itself. The agreement document avoids use of either the
term “reparations” or “compensation” and a previous internal progress
report on the negotiations, circulated to German parliamentarians the
week before the announcement, denied that the payments should be
seen in such terms, claiming, “Reparations or individual
compensations are not subject of the negotiations. After 100 years they
would be unprecedented. The definition of injustice set up by the 1948
convention on the prevention and punishment of genocide does not
apply retrospectively and cannot be the basis for financial claims.”34
The announcement of the agreement has had a mixed response in
Namibia.
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While a spokesman for the Namibian president, Hage Geingob,
described the acknowledgment of genocide “as the first step” in the
right direction, and claimed that, “It is the basis for the second step,
which is an apology, to be followed by reparations,” Vice-President
Nangolo Mbuma noted that the harm caused was in a sense noncompensable, and that the amount proposed was insufficient to amount
to an adequate settlement: “No amount of money in any currency can
truly compensate the life of a human being. We need to recognise that
the amount of 1.1 billion euros agreed upon between the two
governments is not enough and does not adequately address the initial
quantum of reparations initially submitted to the German
Government.”35
The agreement has been explicitly rejected by groups
representing the descendants of the victims, drawn from the minority
Herero and Nama peoples, as opposed to the Ovambo majority group
that dominates the Namibian government.36 In the Namibian
parliament, opposition politicians condemned the agreement, and
argued that key affected groups had not been properly involved in
deliberations. Edson Isaacks, from the opposition Landless People’s
Movement Namibia (LPM), spoke of a “substandard agreement”,
stating, “They have excluded communities, groups of Namibians …
that is apartheid that government has practised.”37 Another LPM
parliamentarian, Utaara Mootu told Prime Minister Saara
Kuugongelwa-Amadhila, "You have betrayed us,” arguing, “'You
have not allowed for equal participation based on human rights
policies. You have not given us the chance to narrate the economic
trauma’ caused by the genocide.”38
The German announcement is certainly striking in that it
represents reparations on a different order of magnitude than has
35
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hitherto been made in relation to European colonialism (leaving aside,
of course, the compensation payment made to slave owners by the
Slave Compensation Act of 1837). But it should be clear that, if only
on account of the reaction of relevant parties with standing, that it
cannot be seen as an example of “good faith settlement”. This
observation does, however, underline how demanding the account of
good faith settlement is. I have argued that the scale of colonial
wrongdoing means that not only the participation (which was in fact
seemingly lacking in the Namibian case), but the agreement of victims
is necessary to the achievement of a just resolution: otherwise, an
unfulfilled reparative obligation persists. Perhaps this conclusion
should be understood relative to some type of provisos: we need a full
account of what it means to be a party with standing, there may not
need to be a requirement for strict unanimity so long as all relevant
groups are in uncoerced, overall agreement, and we might specify that
not only perpetrators but also victims need to be operating, in some
fashion, in good faith. Nonetheless, it follows on my account that the
good faith agreement of all parties with standing is necessary if
settlement is to be reached. It is not enough for the party with
reparative duties to put forward a proposal that they, or some other
third party, deem to be fair or reasonable. It is up to those who have
been wrongfully harmed, and who will end up with less than they
should, to determine what they are prepared to accept.
It is sometimes thought that there is something practical about
the pursuit of reparative justice, as opposed, for example, to its
distributive counterpart – duties are direct, fulfilling them does not
involve the participation of third parties, and the basic principles of
corrective justice are perhaps less controversial than those of
distributive justice.39 Indeed, I have previously argued that it makes
strategic sense for those in favour of significant international
redistribution to couch their arguments in corrective rather than
distributive terms (though I now worry that such a strategy runs the
risk of instrumentalising corrective justice in a morally objectionable
fashion).40 I fear we have ended up somewhere less practical. The
vision of good faith settlement which this article has advocated is one
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whereby parties with extensive reparative duties that they cannot fulfil
are dependent on the good will of those to whom the debt is owed.
Good faith settlement requires a commitment to a process
without knowledge of an outcome. I know of no significant real world
settlement process that obviously realises such an ideal, though I
accept that it is not my place to arbitrate on such matters, but that of
the victims in question. It is obviously hard to see agents such as the
governments of Western states being willing to sign up to such a
process, and perhaps also hard to imagine how it could result in the
kind of broad-based agreement which I have argued is necessary if
good faith settlement is to be realised. This is tragic. There is therefore
a further, inherently political question – if “settling up” is not available,
how should a reparative politics of “settling for” be organised? What
kind of genuine reconciliation, of restoration of the moral equilibrium,
is possible or even desirable when some of the parties to the process
are not willing to act as moral agents? How should the victims of
injustice – wronged once by the initial injustice, wronged again by its
ongoing non-rectification, and now wronged yet again by being
presented with a morally inadequate offer of bad faith settlement,
respond? Such questions are beyond the scope of this article. But it is
clear that the outcome of such a process, even if it has the practical
effect of making things better than they are now, will not be just.

